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Public School Choice and Student Achievement: Evidence From
Michigan’s Interdistrict Open Enrollment System
Joshua M. Cowen
Benjamin Creed
Michigan State University
In this article, we focus on a statewide system of interdistrict open enrollment in Michigan, known as Schools of Choice. Our
previous work indicated that students who take advantage of this program are disproportionately lower performing on state
exams, come from lower-income families, and are more likely to be minority students. We estimated conditional bounds on
these factors, as well as within-student variation in test scores, for the effect of participation in Schools of Choice, and find
little evidence that student achievement is affected overall. We find little consistent evidence that subgroups of students based
on race, gender or income benefit or lose disproportionately from the program, nor do students whose resident districts vary
on key demographic or achievement characteristics.
Keywords: school choice, open enrollment, evaluation

School choice programs remain among the more controversial reforms in American education. The most highly debated
policies are those establishing charter schools or school
voucher programs. In all but seven states, charter schools
operate largely independent of traditional school district control. In 13 states, publicly funded voucher programs directly
support private school tuition for low-income students or students with special needs, while in another 14 states, private
school tuition is subsidized through tax credits or deduction
(Cowen & Toma, 2015). Less debated but firmly established
in the choice landscape are programs permitting parents to
choose traditional public schools outside their residential or
neighborhood-based assignment areas. Twenty-one states
require schools to accept students from outside their home
districts (interdistrict open enrollment) under certain circumstances, while 23 require districts to allow students to choose
within their boundaries (intradistrict open enrollment;
Mikulecky, 2013). In other states, open enrollment is voluntary, but in only Alabama, Illinois, Maryland, and North
Carolina are both intradistrict and interdistrict choice entirely
nonexistent (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).
Perhaps due to the controversies surrounding charter
schools and vouchers, empirical evidence on the educational
effectiveness of these sectors relative to traditional public
schools is substantial. The impact of charter schools in particular on student achievement is well studied (e.g., Angrist,
Dynarski, Kane, Pathak, & Walters, 2012; Bifulco & Ladd,
2006; Booker, Sass, Gill, & Zimmer, 2011; Clark, Gleason,
Tuttle, & Silverberg, 2014; CREDO, 2013; Dobbie & Fryer,
2011; Hoxby & Muraka, 2009; Imberman, 2011a, 2011b;

Sass, 2006). Though by no means uniform, the preponderance of this evidence—especially that drawn from experimental designs which leverage lottery-based admissions—
indicates modest positive effects, though with substantial
state- and school-specific variation in these averages (Betts
& Tang, 2014). The evidence for school vouchers is also well
developed, though more limited than in the charter school
context. Earlier studies in Milwaukee (Greene, Peterson, &
Du, 1999; Rouse, 1998; Witte, 2000) indicated mixed results
but suggested positive voucher impacts especially in math,
while work in Cleveland (e.g., Plucker, Muller, Hansen,
Ravert, & Makel, 2006) found little evidence overall of
voucher effects. Privately funded vouchers in New York City,
Dayton (Ohio), and Washington, DC, generally had positive
effects (Howell & Peterson, 2006), and small but positive
effects on student attainment were found in both New York
City (Chingos & Peterson, 2012) and Milwaukee (Cowen,
Fleming, Witte, Wolf, & Kisida, 2013) and in the first federally funded program in Washington, DC (Wolf et al., 2013).
There is also evidence in Milwaukee that public accountability programs applied to the voucher sector increased student
achievement (Witte, Wolf, Cowen, Carlson, & Fleming,
2014). The exception to the positive or null effects of vouchers comes from recent work in Louisiana that showed negative impacts of students being awarded vouchers and
attending their first-choice school (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak,
& Walters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017).
Relative to studies of charter and voucher impacts on student outcomes, evidence on the effects of participation in
open enrollment systems is relatively scarce. The extant
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studies have been conducted generally in a variety of geographic and programmatic settings, which makes generalizability somewhat difficult due to the wide variation in open
enrollment plans across the country (Cowen, Creed, &
Keesler, 2015; Cowen & Toma, 2015). Evidence from
Chicago’s lottery-based intradistrict open enrollment system
has shown positive impacts of choice (Cullen, Jacob, &
Levitt, 2005), a pattern consistent with data from Charlotte,
North Carolina, (Deming, Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2011;
Hastings & Weinstein, 2007) and evidence from magnet
school lotteries in Connecticut (Bilfulco, Cobb, & Bell,
2009). Nonexperimental evidence from Colorado has been
mixed, with Carlson, Lavery, and Hughes (2014) finding no
immediate effects of transferring but eventual gains to
achievement, particularly in reading, for students who maintained participation over several years. There is also districtlevel evidence from Wisconsin that indicates indirect effects
of open enrollment on outcomes for students remaining in
districts with high enrollment losses: These districts may be
responding to competitive pressures to maintain enrollment
through improved performance (Welsch & Zimmer, 2012).
It is also important to note that open enrollment programs
are not the only source of student transfer within the public
school system. This larger literature on student mobility can
inform the question of open enrollment impacts to some
extent. All else equal, race, academic ability, income, and
family background appear related to student school mobility
and, with few exceptions, the literature has consistently
demonstrated negative academic consequences for students
who move between schools and students in classrooms with
high rates of turnover (Alexander, Entwisle, & Dauber,
1996; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Ingersoll, Scamman,
& Eckerling, 1989; Kerbow, Azcoitia, & Buell, 2003;
Rumberger, Larson, Ream, & Palardy, 1999; South, Haynie,
& Bose, 2007; Temple & Reynolds, 1999; Xu, Hannaway, &
D’Souza, 2009).
In this article, we strengthen the literature on the relationship between open enrollment policies and student outcomes. We focus on the statewide system of interdistrict
open enrollment in Michigan, known as Schools of Choice
(SoC), in which local communities develop their own policies governing nonresident student entry and exit via state
financial and administrative guidelines. Our previous work
(Cowen et al., 2015) has indicated that students who take
advantage of this program are disproportionately lower performing on state exams, come from lower income families,
and are more likely to be minority students. Conditional on
these factors, we estimate bounds for the effects of participating in open enrollment and find little evidence that student test scores change after transferring from one district to
another. We find little consistent evidence that subgroups of
students based on race, gender, and income benefit or lose
disproportionately from the program, nor do students coming from districts with varying demographic or achievement
2

characteristics, although there is evidence suggestive of
small positive effects for students entering the top-performing districts in math as well as districts with fewer African
American students. We conclude this study by discussing the
implications of the evidence for school choice policy and
discuss a number of important limitations to the work.
Background
Previous Research: Who Chooses, Where Do They Go, and
What Are the Effects?
As in studies of charter or private school choice, one of
the critical questions for research on open enrollment programs focuses on the characteristics of students who participate. Among the studies employing student-level data, race,
academic background, and socioeconomic background have
all appeared among the determinants of intra- or interdistrict
choice. Studies of Colorado’s program have indicated that
on some measures, open enrollment students are more
advantaged—they are less likely to be eligible for free/
reduced-price lunch, designated for special educational services, and English-language learning while more likely to
have higher reading achievement scores prior to transferring
(Carlson et al., 2014; Lavery & Carlson, 2015). However,
prior math achievement may be lower for open enrollment
participants, and race plays differential roles depending on
student grade: Hispanics are disproportionately less likely to
transfer, but African Americans in younger grades are more
likely to transfer than White students (Lavery & Carlson,
2015). Descriptive statistics from one large district in the
same region have found less ambiguity, with White students
and those not eligible for free/reduced-price lunch more
likely to participate (Phillips, Hausman, & Larsen, 2012).
Among studies focusing on district-level differences in
open enrollment participation in Colorado, Minnesota, or
Wisconsin, the evidence has indicated that districts with
higher levels of income are considerably more likely to have
high rates of choice (Carlson, Lavery, & Witte, 2011; Holme
& Richards, 2009; Lavery & Carlson, 2015; Welsch, Statz,
& Skidmore, 2010) and that higher levels of achievement
may also be associated with higher levels of public school
choice. A handful of district-level studies have also considered where students who opt into open enrollment actually
attend. Generally, these studies have found that schools and
districts receiving transfer students tended to be better
advantaged, as measured by higher test scores, higher levels
of resident income or housing value, or, in some cases, lower
levels of non-White minority students (Armore & Peiser,
1998; Carlson et al., 2011; Fossey, 1994; Reback, 2008).
Taken as a whole, because there is evidence that districts
with higher levels of achievement send students to districts
with even higher student outcomes and because students
appear to be choosing within and out of comparably highincome districts, the available evidence indicates that open
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enrollment programs are utilized primarily in areas where
socioeconomic and academic advantages are already substantial (Carlson et al., 2011).
Michigan’s SoC Program
In Michigan, various forms of modern school choice have
existed since 1994. The state’s SoC program, established by
the state legislature, governs interdistrict student enrollment.
Michigan school districts are permitted but not required to
participate in SoC.1 Under section 105 of the State School
Aid Act, nonresident parents may choose to enroll their children in a participating local district within the same regionally determined (typically county based) intermediate school
district as their resident district or, under Section 105c,
within a different intermediate district altogether if the
choice district shares a border with the resident intermediate
school district. State funding follows each pupil into the new
district, implying that districts with high net rates of exit
may be substantially, negatively affected, while districts
with high net rates of nonresident entry may realize positive
financial gains (Arsen, DeLuca, Ni, & Bates, 2015). Each
participating district determines specific provisions, including caps on nonresident enrollment, which schools and
grades are eligible to receive nonresidents, whether specific
academic programs are available to nonresidents, and the
timeline for applying for enrollment. Although most districts
in the state nominally accept nonresident students, the provisions for local control imply substantial statewide variation
in the extent to which school choice is realistically available
to individual students.2 In particular, there is no requirement
that districts must provide transportation to nonresident students, although some do. Subject to these provisions, individual students may choose to leave their residential districts
and, in areas with more than one participating district, may
choose among schools in different districts. In addition to
the SoC program authorized at the state level, neighboring
districts may establish local cooperative agreements to permit other forms of student transfers between their borders.
For the present article, we focus exclusively on students participating in interdistrict open enrollment via SoC.
Data
We utilized the Michigan Department of Education’s and
Center for Educational Performance and Information’s
administrative data set from the 2005–2006 school year
through the 2012–2013 school year. This data set contains
demographic information and enrollment history for the universe of Michigan students. The enrollment history contains
information on whether a student participates in Michigan’s
SoC, attends a public school academy (charter school), or
attends school in the district of residency in every year. The
data set also provides Michigan Educational Assessment

Program (MEAP) test scores for students in Grades 3
through 8. Each student receives a unique identification
code upon entry into Michigan public schools, enabling us to
follow a student’s enrollment choices across years. In total,
we are able create a panel spanning 7 years with unique student-year observations which exhaustively covers Michigan
students attending traditional public schools and charter
schools. In our primary analyses, we exclude charter school
students from these comparisons in academic achievement.
Furthermore, we limit our final sample to exclude those students attending alternative schooling options, such as vocational education schools.3 After removal of duplicate entries
for students, our final sample consisted of just over 13 million student-year observations for nearly 3 million individual students in schools serving traditional K–12 students.4
See Appendix for a year-by-year breakdown of SoC and
charter enrollees.
The richness of the Michigan Department of Education
data set enabled us to develop a series of student, school, and
district variables to use in our analysis. At the student level,
we created variables from the data capturing student gender,
race/ethnicity, grade of attendance, free/reduced-price lunch
status, limited English proficiency status, and special-needs
status. In addition to these demographic characteristics, we
were able to include the MEAP scores for students in Grades
3 to 8. We used the MEAP math and reading scores to generate for each subject the student’s MEAP scores standardized
in a given grade, for a given year, at the state level.
We constructed a series of enrollment dummy variables
for each student-year observation, which represent our key
outcome variables of interest. Using the enrollment codes
provided by Michigan Department of Education, we created
a series of dummy variables for use of the SoC policy: in this
article, we focus on students who enrolled in SoC under
either Section 105 or 105c (described earlier). As we describe
later, our primary analyses rest on the ability to observe students before and after participating in SoC. This requires us
to focus on switchers: students who moved into or out of the
program at some point t in their academic careers (specifically, tested Grades 3–8) after having been in their residential district at t – 1 or a SoC district at t – 1, respectively.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of student-year
observations comparing students who never participated in
SoC during our panel with students who participated in at
least 1 year over the duration of the panel. These indicate
relative parity between the groups of students on most demographic metrics, with three important exceptions. Students
who ever participated in SoC tended to be somewhat more
likely to be African American and to be poorer (as measured
by free/reduced-price lunch participation). In addition, SoC
students are lower scoring on average than the state averages
in their grade, year, and subject. These indicators seem to
provide evidence contrary to the “cream-skimming” hypotheses suggested by choice critics in early years. However, it is
3

Cowen and Creed

important to note that both columns in Table 1 are statewide
averages and do not compare choosers and nonchoosers
within a more local context. The tables are entirely consistent with a number of other studies suggesting disproportionate initial take-up of choice, whether vouchers, charters,
or interdistrict choice, among at-risk populations (see, e.g.,
Angrist, Cohodes, Dynarski, Pathak, & Walters, 2016;
Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker, Zimmer, & Buddin, 2005;
Cowen, 2010; Dobbie & Fryer, 2011; Fleming, Cowen,
Witte, & Wolf, 2015; Lavery & Carlson, 2015; Sass, 2006;
Witte et al., 2007), although some of this work has suggested
that such students are more likely to churn in and out of
choice programs, especially from voucher programs (in particular see Carlson, Cowen, & Fleming, 2013; Carlson et al.,
2014; Cowen, Fleming, Witte, & Wolf, 2012; Howell, 2004;
Lavery & Carlson, 2015).5
As noted so far and detailed later, our analytical strategy
requires us to focus on transfers into (and from) SoC program. Table 2 indicates substantial variation in this regard by
focusing on two measures within the population of students
who ever participated. The first panel of Table 2 indicates
that, across the panel of participants, roughly 13% in a given
year t are in their first year, while 15% are in their last year
and 72% in any given year are in neither their first nor last
year. These rates mask a considerable degree of turnover,
however, as across all years, the modal group of students last
for only 1 year in SoC and 60% are in SoC for no more than
3 years. This turnover rate is the subject of an entirely separate analysis (Cowen et al., 2015), but for our purposes here,
we note that this variation does permit our following analytical strategy.
Analytical Strategy
Ideally, we would identify the impact of participation in
SoC on achievement for any student i by observing achievement Y simultaneously at time t for i under participation and
nonparticipation in SoC. The difference in the two potential
outcomes for i in such a scenario would represent the effect
of SoC treatment (e.g., Rubin, 1974). This quantity, while
unobservable, can be estimated if whatever mechanism
determining assignment into participation or nonparticipation conditions is independent of potential outcomes under
either condition—as is in practice achieved when participation is determined randomly via an experimental design. As
noted, the literature on school choice generally has leveraged lottery-based school assignment policies in many studies to approximate experimental conditions. The chief
strength of this approach is that differences between participants and nonparticipants can be interpreted as average
causal effects of participation. A number of policy-relevant
limitations remain, most notably pertaining to (a) external
validity, in cases where oversubscribed schools or schools
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics Based on Enrollment in Schools of Choice
(2005–2012)
Schools of Choice
Variables (All at t)

Never

Ever

Female
White
Black/African American
Hispanic
Multiracial
Elementary school
Middle school
Free/reduced-price lunch
Limited English proficiency
Special needs
MEAP, z score
Math
Reading
Student-year, n (%)

0.485
0.741
0.160
0.056
0.015
0.482
0.518
0.404
0.039
0.137

0.497
0.723
0.192
0.053
0.021
0.516
0.484
0.506
0.014
0.139

0.047
−0.126
0.037
−0.081
4,939,571 (91.39) 465,638 (8.61)

Note. Author calculations from data provided by the Michigan Department
of Education and Center for Educational Performance and Information. All
cells save achievement scores are proportions; achievement scores are standardized to state averages by subject, grade and year.

Table 2
Dynamic Participation in SoC
Yearly Turnover in SoC
Year in SoC at t
First
Last
Neither first nor last
Total
Total years in SoC
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total

%
12.64
15.21
72.15
100.00
31.78
23.13
17.38
11.27
8.37
7.91
100.00

Note. Author calculations from data provided by the Michigan Department
of Education and Center for Educational Performance and Information.
SoC = Schools of Choice.

otherwise using lottery-determined enrollments do not represent the population of providers (especially for the large,
diverse charter school sector), or (b) scale, where smaller
programs do not have similar effects when broadened out to
larger contexts (e.g., pilot voucher programs; see Howell &
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Peterson, 2006; Rouse, 1998). The literature has nevertheless generally prioritized internal over external validity and
lottery-based school choice studies are practically de rigueur
in the literature.
Unfortunately, no such conditions are available in this
study since the Michigan Department of Education does not
collect data on which students were admitted via local SoC
lotteries in their applicant districts nor even, more generally,
which districts employ lotteries. However, as we argue in
our discussion, the approach that we do employ provides
suggestive evidence of participation impacts still valuable to
the literature and to policy making, particularly given that
interdistrict choice programs are highly understudied.
More to the point, the lack of experimental data is still
quite common in the choice literature and there is a welldeveloped set of techniques available in this literature to provide meaningful analyses of such nonexperimental differences.
In particular, we seek here to establish bounds of an SoC
effect in the spirit of Bifulco and Ladd (2006) and Sass (2006)
by following, especially, Imberman (2011a, 2011b) and others
in leveraging within-student differences in achievement (i.e.,
student fixed effects and value-added estimates) to obtain
quasi-experimental estimates of the SoC effect.
We first estimate the relationship between SoC and student test scores using the following student fixed effects
model, which we call the levels model:
yit = α + βSit + Cit γ + gradeyearit δ + Φi + εit .

(1)

In this model, yit is an outcome for student i at time t; Sit is
an indicator variable for participation in SoC at time t; Cit is
a vector of time-variant demographic characteristics; gradeyear is a series of grade-by-year indicator variables; Φi is an
individual fixed effect that also accounts for the specific rules
governing SoC participation in the student’s resident district;
and εit is an idiosyncratic error term clustered by resident district. Because Sit is set to equal 1 only when a student is in
SoC and because this fixed effects model subsumes all timeinvariant information about the student, β is identified by students who switch into or out of the program. If on average
students’ test scores are higher in their SoC environment,
estimates of β will be positive; if scores are lower while students are in SoC, estimates of β will be negative. This model
sets one of the bounds for the effect of utilizing SoC on student test scores. To set the other bound, we estimate a version
of Equation 1 by including prior achievement in a gains or
value added model. We set the outcome to the annual change
in the standardized MEAP math and reading test scores:
yit − yit −1 = α + βSit + Cit γ + gradeyearit δ + Φi + εit .

(2)

This gains model provides the other estimated bound for
the true impact of participation in SoC on student test scores;
see Imberman (2011a, Appendix), who provides a proof of

the bounds set by the levels and gains versions of the fixed
effects model in a similar student transfer context. The
insight by Imberman is that the effect of SoC participation in
a fixed effects model in which the true rate of decay (the
impact of past on current achievement) is known is bounded
by the levels model in which there is no relationship between
past and current outcomes (a decay rate of 0) and the gains
version in which the rate is 1. It is not possible to account for
the true rate of decay in one fixed effects model without
introducing different forms of endogeneity. The estimate of
the effect of choice participation in which the true rate of
decay is known is therefore bounded between the two models that assume rates of 0 and 1.6
The selection of parents and students into the SoC program may be a concern for the estimation of the effect of
SoC. The student fixed effects approach that we use accounts
for any time-invariant characteristics of the students, whether
observed or unobserved. Furthermore, the grade-by-year
dummies control for any grade and year specific effects.
However, the approach assumes that the relevant studentlevel factors determining choice and test scores are time
invariant.
For example, if there were systematic trends in outcomes
prior to the use of SoC, these would bias our estimates. The
school choice literature, drawing on the job-training literature (e.g., Ashenfelter, 1978), suggests the need to examine
the outcome trends leading up to the decision to switch out
of a school (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Imberman, 2011a; Sass,
2006). If families utilize SoC in response to a child’s declining performance, a key assumption (strict exogeneity) of the
fixed effects is violated: that past or future outcomes are not
associated with the enrollment in SoC. In the spirit of
Carlson et al. (2013) and Imberman (2011a), to test this, we
regressed student standardized test score gains on student
and grade-by-year fixed effects. We then plotted the residuals by years pre- and post-switch to examine the trends.
Figures 1 and 2 display these results. When exploring the
case for an Ashenfelter-type dip, we do not find strong evidence that this is the case. For reading, student-level and
gains standardized scores show a slight drop of .005 SD in
the year prior to the switch. In math, there is no evidence of
a concerning dip, as math gains scores trend upward prior to
the switch and math-level scores trend downward in the
lead-up to the switch. In any case, all point estimates in these
graphs are very small.
For both the levels and the gains models, we explore if
there are heterogeneous results for different subgroups: male/
female, race/ethnicity, language status, free/reduced-price
lunch status, quartiles of achievement, and the number of
years participating in SoC. Previous work exploring who
uses SoC in Michigan revealed differing patterns based on
average resident district characteristics (Cowen et al., 2015).
We estimate the levels and gains models grouping districts by
quartiles of (a) mean district achievement, (b) the district’s
5

Figure 1. Ashenfelter dip check for standardized math scores: Michigan Educational Assessment Program. Graphs are gain scores
demeaned by student and grade-by-year fixed effects. The vertical line represents the year prior to choice and, thus, the location an
Ashenfelter type dip would exist.

Figure 2. Ashenfelter dip check for standardized reading scores: Michigan Educational Assessment Program. Graphs are gain
scores demeaned by student and grade-by-year fixed effects. The vertical line represents the year prior to choice and, thus, the location
an Ashenfelter type dip would exist.

proportion of African American students, and (c) the district’s
proportion of free/reduced-price lunch students.
Results
Table 3 presents the full results of our estimates of
Equations 1 and 2. As the first two columns of results
6

indicate, there is no evidence of an impact of SoC on math, a
finding also present for reading. We note that employing
alternative specifications of the contextual fixed effects (i.e.,
district by year and a grade fixed effect separately) does not
change these results. Taken together, these estimated bounds
provide summary evidence that on average the overall impact
of SoC is close to zero. Table 4 provides subgroup analyses

Table 3
Estimated Schools of Choice Impact Bounds Based on Levels and
Gains
Math

Schools of
Choice
Limited English
proficiency
Free/reducedprice lunch
Special needs
Observations, n
R2

Table 4
Estimated Bounds for Student Subgroups
Math

Reading

Levels

Gain

−0.003
(0.005)
−0.055***
(0.016)
0.000
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
5,077,374
0.840

0.000
(0.005)
0.062***
(0.014)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.004)
3,547,963
0.202

Levels

Levels
Gain

0.001
0.003
(0.004)
(0.005)
−0.073*** 0.040***
(0.014)
(0.010)
0.001
−0.001
(0.003)
(0.003)
−0.033*** 0.034***
(0.002)
(0.005)
5,058,891 3,535,391
0.792
0.185

Note. Estimates are drawn from Equations 1 and 2. Robust standard errors
clustered by resident district in parentheses.
*p < .10. ***p < .01.

for students based on race, gender, free/reduced-price lunch,
and limited English proficiency status as well as achievement
quartile at t – 1. As in the main analyses, the preponderance
of the evidence suggests little to no difference associated
with participation in SoC for most groups. The gains results
in Table 4 are consistently insignificant.
Table 5 presents dosage results, which explore if there is
an additive difference associated with having remained in
SoC for up to 4 years in addition posttransfer. We estimated
levels and gains models with a series of dummy variables for
the number of years after switching into SoC. This specification allows for the possibility that students accrue positive
(or negative) gains from SoC over time in the program. The
results from this dosage analysis show zero or small impact
of SoC on student outcomes. Given our earlier work indicating that most students transfer out of the program fairly
quickly (Cowen et al., 2015) and that such students tend to
be low performing relative to their new peers and tend to be
minority students, we might worry that such programmatic
attrition biases our estimates of longer-term gains even
though prior achievement is explicitly accounted for in the
gains model and race is accounted for in both. We provide
estimates in Table 5 largely to indicate that even descriptive
evidence suggests no consistent longer-term gain (or loss) to
SoC participation.
Table 6 displays the coefficient of SoC on the corresponding test score, as it varies by receiving district-level quartiles
related to achievement, percentage African American, and
percentage free/reduced-price lunch. Overall, the results
from this quartile analysis show flat impacts of SoC use on
achievement. There are three exceptions to null results. Based

Female
Male
White
Black
Hispanic
Limited English
proficiency
Free/reduced-price
lunch
Non–free/reducedprice lunch
Quartile 1 (lowest)
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4 (highest)

*

−0.009
(0.005)
0.004
(0.006)
−0.005
(0.004)
0.006
(0.016)
0.015
(0.010)
0.015
(0.024)
0.002
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.006)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)

Reading
Gain

Levels

Gain

−0.002
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.009
(0.020)
−0.030
(0.034)
0.002
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
−0.003
(0.008)
0.004
(0.007)
0.001
(0.009)
0.003
(0.014)

−0.003
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
−0.000
(0.011)
−0.003
(0.011)
−0.031
(0.024)
0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.000
(0.003)

0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.006)
−0.005
(0.010)
0.023
(0.021)
0.032
(0.068)
0.003
(0.007)
0.003
(0.007)
−0.009
(0.008)
−0.004
(0.009)
0.002
(0.010)
−0.015
(0.017)

Note. Each cell represents a separate subgroup estimate of β in Equations 1
and 2 by subgroup referenced, with robust standard errors clustered by resident district in parentheses. Each regression includes student-level controls.
*p < .10. **p < .05.

on the levels analysis, there is potentially a small positive difference in math for students who move to high-performing
districts (Quartile 4) through SoC and to districts with the
lowest proportion of African American students (Quartile 1).
Students attending the lowest-performing districts (Quartile
1) may see a slight decline in reading scores. In earlier work
(Cowen, Creed, & Keesler, 2015), we do note that average
choosers are substantially lower performing and more likely
to be minority students than nonchoosers and that in general
all students move to a higher-performing or at least no worse
set of schools than where they left. It is possible that the
results in Table 6 do indicate that some students are finding
better fit elsewhere. In addition, given the sheer number of
significance tests across the different subgroups, we would
expect to see a handful of estimates cross into statistically
significant thresholds. We do not adjust these tests for multiple comparisons simply because all estimates are so small
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Table 5
Dosage Results

Table 6
Dosage Results
Dosage Level
Math

Years in Schools
of Choice
1
2
3
4+
Limited English
proficiency
Free/reducedprice lunch
Special needs
n
R2

0.010
(0.017)
−0.002
(0.034)
−0.012
(0.048)
−0.004
(0.058)
−0.020
(0.058)
0.014
(0.012)
−0.026
(0.028)
80,424
0.885

Reading

0.003
(0.015)
−0.017
(0.031)
0.007
(0.044)
−0.009
(0.064)
−0.047
(0.058)
−0.003
(0.015)
−0.023
(0.030)
80,331
0.864

Dosage Gain
Math

0.012
(0.030)
−0.027
(0.050)
−0.026
(0.060)
−0.002
(0.080)
0.012
(0.080)
0.010
(0.028)
−0.016
(0.037)
78,504
0.420

Reading

−0.009
(0.025)
−0.045
(0.046)
−0.007
(0.056)
−0.046
(0.082)
−0.017
(0.086)
0.003
(0.023)
0.060
(0.048)
78,383
0.412

Note. Estimates are versions of Equations 1 and 2 where the indicator for
Schools of Choice is replaced by multiple indicators for which year in
Schools of Choice posttransfer the student entered. Robust standard errors
clustered by resident district in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

(≤0.01 SD) that their substantive significance is doubtful
even in the presence of low P values. The evidence in Table
6 does provide limited evidence, however, that the impact of
participation in SoC may depend on where students move.
Discussion
In this study, we explore the impact of participation in
Michigan’s SoC program, a nonresidential public school
choice program, on student math and reading achievement
scores. Although our results are based on nonexperimental
methods that do not allow us to rule out the possibility of a
confounding relationship between SoC participation and
unobservable student or family characteristics that are also
related to achievement, our evidence does provide an estimate of the bounds within which such impacts are likely to
fall. The preponderance of this evidence suggests little to no
effect of participation in SoC.
From the perspective that guides much of the motivation
for school choice policy, such results may be surprising. If
parents are enrolling their children in nonresident districts in
an attempt to find the best academic (or otherwise) fit, we
should expect some relative gains to outcomes to the extent
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Dosage Level

Years in Schools
of Choice
1
2
3
4+
Limited English
proficiency
Free/reducedprice lunch
Special needs
n
R2

Dosage Gain

Math

Reading

Math

Reading

0.010
(0.017)
−0.002
(0.034)
−0.012
(0.048)
−0.004
(0.058)
−0.020
(0.058)
0.014
(0.012)
−0.026
(0.028)
80,424
0.885

0.003
(0.015)
−0.017
(0.031)
0.007
(0.044)
−0.009
(0.064)
−0.047
(0.058)
−0.003
(0.015)
−0.023
(0.030)
80,331
0.864

0.012
(0.030)
−0.027
(0.050)
−0.026
(0.060)
−0.002
(0.080)
0.012
(0.080)
0.010
(0.028)
−0.016
(0.037)
78,504
0.420

−0.009
(0.025)
−0.045
(0.046)
−0.007
(0.056)
−0.046
(0.082)
−0.017
(0.086)
0.003
(0.023)
0.060
(0.048)
78,383
0.412

Note. Estimates are versions of Equations 1 and 2 where the indicator for
Schools of Choice is replaced by multiple indicators for which year in
Schools of Choice posttransfer the student entered. Robust standard errors
clustered by resident district in parentheses.

that parents are actually correct in their assessments of such
needs. However, as we have argued in our earlier work on the
program (Cowen et al., 2015), the high rate of mobility among
districts coupled with a disproportionately at-risk population
of choosers—high minority, low income, and relatively low
achieving—more closely resembles the sort of natural student
attrition among schools found in large districts. In those settings, mobility rarely if ever results in net gains and often
results instead in net losses to student outcomes even when
students are sorting into better schools (Alexander et al., 1996;
Hanushek et al., 2004; Ingersoll et al., 1989; Kerbow et al.,
2003; Rumberger et al., 1999; South et al., 2007; Temple &
Reynolds, 1999; Xu et al., 2009). Deliberate, well-informed
parental choice may have positive outcomes in some settings,
such as charter schools, but mobility itself is otherwise not a
net positive. From that perspective, the results here may not be
surprising at all. From another perspective, the results may
indicate a net positive development if the null effects of this
study are essentially driven by the typical adverse consequences of student transfer being offset by benefits from the
choice to participate in SoC.7
It is difficult to speculate on the extent to which the particular design features of Michigan’s SoC policy mediate or
even drive these apparent null effects. We noted that although
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state law authorizes the program and state dollars follow students who choose nonresident districts, the rules governing
participation are highly decentralized. Different districts
make different decisions pertaining to the availability of
seats, enrollment deadlines, and even decisions that may
fundamentally determine accessibility to schools, such as
whether to provide transportation to nonresident students.
One explanation of our results could simply be that heterogeneous effects of choice exist across many different communities in Michigan. If so, this would suggest a important
avenue for qualitative case study work in some districts to
identify best practices that lead to student gains in those
communities. Incorporating such rules at the state level
would, however, require changes to policy that promoted a
more centralized, coordinated system of choice.
There are a number of other important caveats to this
study. The first is that although our methodological approach
includes estimated bounds for the true effect of participation
in SoC, the study remains an observational rather than
experimental analysis. Absent the ability to randomly assign
students to different schools or observe enrollments based
on lottery in oversubscribed districts, we cannot entirely rule
out the possibility that our lack of positive or negative
impacts overall is driven at least in part by hidden factors
correlated with student achievement levels or gains and the
decision to participate in the first place. This caveat applies
to all such work on school choice impacts.
Second, we cannot observe, on the basis of our approach,
any long-term impact of sustained participation in SoC
from kindergarten onward. Cowen et al. (2015) indicated
that students who begin SoC in kindergarten and stay in
their nonresident schools are likely different—at least
somewhat more advantaged—than those who transfer
among districts over time. It is possible that such students
do gain (or lose) test score advantages relative to some
counterfactual scenario in which they were not able to participate from the beginning of their academic careers at all.
Although some nonexperimental methods do exist in the
literature to consider such students—propensity score analysis, for example—the best of these methods tend to require
at least one prechoice test score to even approach an unbiased estimate of impacts (Bifulco, 2012). Thus, by definition, we are limited to the group of children who transfer at
some point over time. As we have argued, our results must
be interpreted as evidence of the impact of participation in
SoC for those who transfer between districts at some point
rather than the impact of beginning elementary school in an
SoC school and continuing throughout. However, because
the majority of children—especially African Americans and
children receiving free/reduced-price lunch—do not spend
the majority of their early elementary careers in SoC, our
finding of little academic benefit or loss associated with
participation is likely to reflect the experience of many
participants.

What this implies is that whatever else are the implications of student mobility among Michigan school districts, the consequences do not appear to be borne out in
terms of student achievement one way or the other. This
presents our final caveat: As in other choice settings
nationally, Michigan’s SoC program may have a strong
rationale well apart from academic achievement. A number of studies have shown that parents value other features of schools, including but also apart from academic
gains, especially when making a school choice (e.g.,
Glazerman & Dotter, in press; Harris & Larsen, 2015;
Lincove, Cowen, & Imbrogno, in press), and this implies
that our results here are limited in their ability to inform
an overall assessment of interdistrict transfer in Michigan.
If the purpose of SoC is to provide parents the flexibility
to enroll their children in public schools for reasons unrelated to their residential location—as employment circumstances may require, for example, or to make use of
particular extracurricular activities or for any other motivation—then our results here do nothing to suggest that
such a purpose is going unmet. From that perspective, it
may simply be encouraging that there does not appear to
be any net loss with respect to student test scores. Taken
as a whole, neither supporters nor critics of this particular
interdistrict enrollment program should look to participant test scores to make their case. The strengths or weaknesses of the program as a public policy appear to lie
elsewhere.
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Notes
1. Michigan State School Aid Act (MCL 388.1705, 388.1705c,
§§ 105, 105c) and Michigan Department of Education (http://
mi.gov/documents/mde/choice1_279579_7.pdf).
2. For example, some districts participate at minimum levels required to receive Best Practices funding from the state
(http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/Best_Practice_
Guidance_463861_7.pdf).
3. We make this exclusion largely because we are unable to
observe within all districts whether students in these programs are
there because they are assigned to be or choose to be.
4. Approximately 5.75% of student-years (806,341) had multiple records for a given year in the raw data. An examination of the
data revealed that this occurred typically when students switched
schools midyear. We used a three-step process to deal with duplicate
student observations in time: (a) If a student participated in SoC at
any point in time t, all non-SoC entries were dropped; (b) if a student had multiple observations associated with SoC enrollment, we
kept the record associated with the earliest SoC enrollment (e.g.,
we selected the October enrollment record over a December enrollment date); and (c) for students with multiple records in a given t
who never enrolled in SoC, we randomly selected an observation
for the student in year t.
5. Attention to systematic attrition from charter schools and
open enrollment in Michigan is the subject of our other work
(Cowen et al., 2015).
6. Sass (2006) actually uses the Arellano-Bond estimator, which
essentially first differences a version of our Equation 1 and then
instruments for the lagged dependent variable using earlier lags
(usually t – 2). However, more recent work (e.g., Imberman 2011a;
Todd & Wolpin, 2007) indicates that such an approach is likely to
retain endogeneity at least when student achievement is the dependent variable. Thus, we prefer the more recent Imberman method,
which does not impose assumptions on any one model but in fact
allows the researcher to make inferences about a range (or bound)
of estimates rather than a single estimate.
7. This would imply a potentially interesting counterfactual:
that school choice studies would be a comparison not with those
who do not choose but with those who appear to be simply transferring among schools for unobserved reasons (i.e., those not
formally making use of a choice program). If school choice is
actually just one more narrow form of school mobility and there
are otherwise negative consequences to mobility, estimates of
choice participation may actually be understated. In other words,
null effects actually represent a positive impact of choice programs on students when compared with other forms of student
mobility. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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Appendix
Table A1
Enrollment Numbers for SoC, Public School (Charter)
Academies, and Traditional Public School (2005–2012)
Year

SoC

PSA

Total K–12
Enrollment

64,754
3.81

90,466
5.33

1,697,850
100

70,468
4.15

98,023
5.77

1,699,299
100

82,885
4.84

107,774
6.29

1,713,014
100

86,281
5.12

103,925
6.17

1,683,655
100

90,027
5.54

107,384
6.61

1,624,426
100

86,683
5.55

102,520
6.56

1,561,672
100

104,035
6.62

111,313
7.09

1,570,453
100

110,196
7.20

113,762
7.43

1,530,265
100

781,610
5.98

939,092
7.18

13,080,634
100
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